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This paper explores the relationship between the regulatory policies of the 
European Union and the Union’s trade relations with the United States and other 
countries. The first section examines the general issue of trade and environment, 
placing it within the context of the rules and procedures of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)AVorld Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Section two discusses two of the most visible trade disputes over the alleged use 
of environmental regulations as trade barriers that have involved the European 
Union. Both disputes involved the United States: the first stemmed from the 
impact of American automotive fuel economy standards on European luxury car 
exports to the US and the second from an American ban on imports of European 
processed tuna fish. The paper then turns to a series of ongoing trade conflicts in 
which the EU has been accused of engaging in unfair trade practices to promote 
conservation, protect wildlife and promote eco-labelling. In light of these 
disputes, the concluding section assesses the EU's recent proposals to reform the 
environmental provisions of the GATT/WTO and draws some general 
conclusions about the development of EU policies and practices on trade and 
environmental protection.
The growing linkages between trade policies and environmental 
regulations in recent years stem from the convergence of two policy objectives: 
trade liberalisation and environmental protection (Vogel 1995). The increase in 
economic integration has subjected a growing number of national policies, 
including environmental regulation, to greater international scrutiny. These 
regulations are rarely neutral and often, either intentionally or unintentionally, 
disadvantage foreign producers. At the same time, the number of environmental 
regulations has continued to expand. Many of these regulations, especially those 
directed at protecting the global commons, include trade restrictions either 
because the harm they address is trade-related or because they are enforced 
through trade sanctions. Consequently, there is frequently a tension between 
reducing trade barriers and strengthening environmental standards.
Since there is often substantial disagreement as to whether or not a 
particular environmental regulation constitutes an unreasonable interference with 
trade, balancing trade liberalisation and environmental protection poses a difficult 
challenge. As the world's foremost effort to promote trade liberalisation, the EU 
has been wrestling with this challenge for at least two decades. The European 
Court of Justice has developed an extensive body of jurisprudence which defines 
the circumstances under which the environmental regulation of a member state 
violates its treaty obligations while the Council of Ministers has established a 
number of uniform regulatory standards in order to both maintain the single 



























































































By contrast, the GATTAVTO has experienced much more difficulty in 
balancing these two policy objectives. Unlike the EU, the GATTAVTO lacks the 
authority to impose environmental regulations. As a more specialised and much 
weaker organisation, the GATTAVTO only has the authority to determine when a 
national, or in the case of the EU, regional environmental standard, violates the 
principles of free trade. Moreover, while a commitment to strengthening 
environmental regulations was incorporated into the provisions of the Single 
European Act of 1986, the first mention of the word “environment” in the 
GATTAVTO did not occur until the Uruguay round agreement of 1994.
The preamble to the Standards Code, which was incorporated into the 
provisions of the newly established WTO, states that each country “may maintain 
standards and technical regulations for the protection of human, animal, and plant 
life and health and of the environment” (Vogel 1995:136). The agreement also 
requires that national standards or “technical barriers to trade” “not be more trade- 
restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking into account the 
risks non-fulfilment would create” (Vogel 1995:136). As we shall see, these two 
provisions leave a number of critical questions unanswered.
Trade Disputes 
Fuel Economy
The most important environmentally-related trade dispute involving the EU 
occurred in 1993, when the EU requested the convening of a dispute settlement 
panel to rule on the GATT consistency of American corporate average fuel 
economy (CAFE) standards, the so-called gas-guzzler tax, and a tax on luxury 
automobiles. The EU's complaint centred on the fact that all three burdens fell 
disproportionately on European companies. While European cars accounted for 
only 4 percent of American sales in 1991, they contributed 88% of the revenues 
collected by American luxury taxes and CAFE penalties, totalling $494 million 
(Lavelle 1993:39). The purpose of the CAFE standards, originally established in 
1975 and subsequently tightened in 1980, is to promote fuel efficiency. They are 
based on the miles per gallon achieved by a sales-weighted average of all vehicles 
produced by a manufacturer. If a manufacturer's vehicles fall below this standard 
(which in 1993 was 27.6 miles per gallon) they face a penalty of $5.00 for every 
tenth of a mile per gallon, multiplied by the number of automobiles sold in the 
United States.
Although this penalty applies equally to all car manufacturers, it has been 




























































































American automobile firms make a full line of cars, they have avoided the tax on 
their less fuel-efficient luxury cars by averaging their fuel economy with the rest 
of their fleet. Japanese car firms have avoided the tax because they mostly make 
smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles. According to A.B. Shuman, public relations 
manager for Mercedes-Benz of North America, CAFE rules “are really made for 
the Big Three. The problem for Europeans is that...they don't have little cars to 
balance out the higher-consumption cars” (Lavelle 1993:39).
In its complaint to the GATT, the EC argued that “the CAFE regulations 
are biased toward the full-line manufacturers and limited-line manufacturers that 
produce mostly small vehicles” (Dunne 1993:5). The EC claimed that because 
CAFE penalties fell only on imported cars, they violated the GATT's national 
treatment provision. The EC further argued that the 1978 “gas guzzler tax,” which 
was based on a threshold fuel economy standard of 22.5 mpg—was not only 
discriminatory but was not based on any objective or reasonable criteria. Finally, 
the EU claimed that the $30,000 cutoff for the luxury tax was both “capricious” 
and discriminatory, since in 1990, the year the tax was introduced as part of the 
1990 budget reconciliation bill, more than 80 per cent of the vehicles subject to it 
were imports (TE 1993:4).
In the fall of 1994, the GATT dispute panel found all three taxes to be 
GATT consistent. The panel noted that while the EU was correct in suggesting 
that the American policy objective of promoting fuel efficiency could be achieved 
in ways that were less trade-restrictive, namely by increasing gasoline taxes, it 
declined to hold the United States to a “least trade restrictive” standard. Rather it 
concluded that all the United States needed to demonstrate was that its regulation 
achieved a legitimate environmental objective, a category in which fuel 
conservation fell. The panel also upheld the GATT consistency of both the gas 
guzzler and luxury taxes, since they were levied on products rather than on 
companies.
The United States was extremely pleased with the GATT panel ruling. 
According to USTR head Micky Kantor, “The panel has emphatically rejected the 
Europeans' claim that trade-neutral legislation intended to further energy 
conservation goals and protect the environment could be attacked because 
Chrysler, Ford and GM invested and complied with the law while Mercedes and 
BMW chose not to and had to pay penalties” (IUST 1994:S-1). However, the 
European Commission characterised the panel report as a “backward step in the 
interpretation of GATT Article III that risks opening the door for inventive tax 





























































































The dispute panel did rule that the provision of the CAFE legislation 
requiring companies to meet CAFE averages for both their domestic and imported 
cars (the so-called separate fleet accounting rules) was GATT inconsistent, since 
it treated similar products differently on the basis of where they were 
manufactured. The United States refused to change this provision on the grounds 
that it had no adverse impact on European companies, since all their cars were 
imported. Nonetheless, the EU criticised the US action. As one EU official put it: 
“We object to the fact that the U.S. appears unwilling to change the CAFE law 
...Such a posture by the U.S. does not bode well for the future of the multilateral 
trade system of the World Trade Organisation” (IUST 1994:S-7).
Tuna/Dolphin
One of the most contentious source of conflicts between GATT/WTO rules and 
environmental regulations has involved the use of import restrictions to promote 
global conservation. During the 1970s, in order to protect dolphins in the eastern 
tropical Pacific from being killed by tuna fishermen, the United States established 
a dolphin kill quota for its fishing fleets. In 1990, as a result of a federal court 
decision, this regulatory standard was applied to foreign tuna vessels as well. 
Consequently, the United States banned imports of tuna from Mexico and 
Venezuela on the grounds that the fishing practices of their fleets violated 
American standards for dolphin protection. At the same time, the United States 
also prohibited tuna imports from Costa Rica, France, Italy, Japan and Panama 
since these countries purchased tuna from the nations subject to a direct embargo.
Mexico immediately filed a complaint with the GATT. It claimed that 
GATT rules prohibit a nation from restricting the import of a product bn the basis 
of how it was produced outside its borders. Mexico's complaint was supported by 
the European Union, which reiterated its long-standing objections to American 
unilateralism in pursuit of global environmental objectives (Maggs 1992:3A).
In April, 1991, a GATT dispute panel ruled that the American trade 
embargo violated its GATT obligations, since, according to the trade agreement's 
“national treatment” provision (Article III), imports can only be restricted on the 
basis of characteristics of the product itself—provided similar restrictions are 
imposed on domestically-produced ones. The GATT does not permit signatory 
nations to “restrict imports of a product merely because [the product] originates 
from a country with environmental policies different from its own” (Housman 
and Zaelke 1992:10274).
Following the passage of the International Dolphin Conservation Act of 




























































































countries that they had been removed from the list of nations subject to the 
intermediary embargo as they had certified that they were no longer importing 
yellowfm tuna from the nations still subject to the direct embargo. However, the 
American secondary embargo continued to be applied to tuna imports from four 
nations: Spain, Italy, Costa Rica and Japan.
The EU had criticised Mexico's refusal to submit the tuna/dolphin dispute 
panel report to the GATT Council, which would have enabled it to become 
officially adopted. It argued that “what had started as a dispute between two 
parties was now of interest to us all,” and demanded that the GATT Council hold 
a full debate on the tuna report in order to correct the false “impression in some 
quarters that the report had placed environmental and trade issues on a collision 
course” (GF 1992:5). Frustrated by the fact that the panel report enjoyed no legal 
standing, the European Union, acting on behalf of the two member states still 
affected by the American embargo, requested a second dispute resolution panel in 
June, 1992.
In its brief the EC stated that “while it agrees with the environment goal 
being pursued by the US, it objects to the U.S. imposing its laws on the rest of the 
world” (GF 1992:5).2 It also claimed that it had suffered substantial economic 
injury, because tuna fish that otherwise would have been sold in the United States 
was flooding the world market, thus lowering tuna prices outside the United 
States.
In its submission to the panel, the United States argued that its secondary 
embargo fell well within the terms of Article XX, since it was intended to protect 
an “exhaustible natural resource,” whose physical presence on the high seas made 
“them more rather than less in need of conservation” (GF 1992:5). Furthermore, it 
had been imposed in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production and 
consumption; indeed, far from being protectionist, the United States had imposed 
even more stringent requirements on its own fishing fleets. The United States 
further argued that “there is nothing in the General Agreement that distinguishes 
between 'unilateral' measures and other types of measures.” In fact, the term 
“unilateral” appears nowhere in the General Agreement. Moreover, “the vast 
majority of measures taken by sovereign nations in all fields of activity are 
unilateral” (Marshall 1992:A8). According to the Americans, “at stake is the 
ability of a nation to take measures to protect global resources” (Fraser 1992:4).
In June 1994, a GATT dispute panel also found the secondary embargo to 
be GATT inconsistent. As in the case of the first tuna/dolphin dispute, the United
2 Contrast this view of extraterritorial environmental protection with the one adopted by the 




























































































States refused to comply with the panel ruling. However, in 1995, the United 
States, along with Costa Rica, France, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela, signed the 
Panama Declaration. This is an international agreement which limits the total 
number of dolphin deaths as well as protecting sea turtles and small fish (ENS 
1995). Once this agreement is ratified by the U.S., American restrictions on tuna 
imports will be lifted.
Ongoing Trade Disputes
Animal Protection
Notwithstanding its harsh criticism of American unilateralism, the EU has 
frequently engaged in similar practices. In 1983, following a number of 
resolutions by the European Parliament that drew public attention to the hunting 
methods used to cull baby seals off the Canadian coast, the European Council 
banned the import of skins of pup harp and hooded seals, as well as products 
derived from them (Freestone 1991:141, Demaret 1993:328-9). The Council, 
hesitant to directly threaten Canada's economic interests, justified its restriction 
not on humanitarian grounds but on the need to preserve the common market, 
since a number of member states had enacted similar bans.
The Canadian Government strongly protested the EU's action and filed a 
complaint with the GATT on the grounds that the General Agreement only 
permits a nation to unilaterally ban the import of a product which is only 
produced outside its borders if the product's consumption harms its own citizens 
or environment. Canada subsequently withdrew its complaint and shortly 
thereafter announced an end, on conservation grounds, to all commercial hunting 
of seal pups. When the EU extended the ban in 1988, the European Commission 
noted that harp seal pup hunting in both Canada and Norway had significantly 
declined as a result of both its 1983 Directive and the hunting restrictions both 
countries had adopted.
In 1991, the European Council again approved a trade restriction to protect 
wild animals outside its legal jurisdiction (Demaret 1993:330). The Council 
banned leghold traps to catch wild animals within the Union and, beginning in 
1995, prohibited the importation of thirteen species of fur from nations that 
continued to use leghold traps, rather than more “humane trapping standards” 
(Simon 1991:2). Like the restriction on imports of products made from baby 
seals, this policy was motivated by an intense campaign on the part of European 
animal rights groups, whose supporters including the actress turned activist 




























































































industry, which relies upon “farming” rather than trapping. In part due to anti-fur 
movements in a number of European countries, this industry has experienced a 
severe decline in sales.
The ban was primarily aimed at the United States, Canada and the 
countries belonging to the former Soviet Union-the main suppliers of pelts of 
wild mammals to the Union's fur industry. The EC's decision provoked a 
particular outcry from Canada, where approximately 80,000 trappers earn more 
than $30 million a year from pelt exports to Europe (Simon 1991). Elalf of these 
trappers are aborigines, many of whom depend on trapping for most of their 
income; a delegation of native Canadians accused the EU of committing “cultural 
genocide” (Southey 1995:4). Approximately 70 percent of the furs harvested in 
North America are exported to Europe.
Caught between pressures from the European Parliament and animal 
welfare groups on one hand, and anxious to avoid a trade dispute with the United 
States and Canada on the other, in November 1995, the European Commission 
decided to postpone the import ban for a year to allow its trading partners to find 
a more humane alternative to leg-hold traps and reach agreement on an 
international standard for fur harvesting. The Commission also exempted furs 
from animal traps caught by indigenous people from the ban. The Commission's 
announcement was immediately denounced by European animal welfare activists 
(EE 1996). On December 14, 1995, the European Parliament condemned the 
Commission's action by a vote of 262 to 46; it called upon the EC to institute a 
ban immediately. In language reminiscent of the response of American 
environmentalists to the GATT tuna/dolphin decision, the Commission was 
accused of “sacrificing animals on the alter of free world trade” (AE 1996).
In March, 1996, EU environment ministers, frustrated by the lack of 
progress on an international standard, warned exporters that the Union would 
implement its ban in December unless discussions aimed at finding an alternative 
to leg-hold traps produced satisfactory results (FT 1996:5). They also announced 
their opposition to exempting furs and skins caught by indigenous populations 
from a ban. One member state, the Netherlands, chose to ignore the Commission 
and instituted an import ban on furs and skins from animals caught with leg-hold 
traps. The United States and Canada responded to the Dutch action by threatening 
to file a complaint with the WTO (UPI 1996). In May 1996, a delegation of fur 
trappers from North America arrived in Brussels to lobby the EP against the ban 
claiming that they have developed new types of traps that are less cruel to 
animals. For its part, the Commission is continuing to work with the International 




























































































according to the WTO Standards Code, a trade restriction based on a standard 
which is internationally recognised is more likely to be found WTO-consistent.
Forest Protection
The European Parliament has also called upon the Union to halt all imports of 
tropical hardwoods originating in Sarawak, Malaysia on the grounds that logging 
in that region is proceeding at “a devastating pace” (Demeret 1993:334-5). It has 
also requested that the Union promote conservation by limiting the importation of 
hardwoods to countries which had adopted “Forestry Management and 
Conservation Plans.” The effect of the latter proposal would be to involve the 
Union in negotiating quotas with each producing country, which it already does 
for a number of agricultural products, though for economic rather than 
environmental reasons.
However both the Council and the Commission have resisted these 
pressures from the EP on the grounds that it would be inappropriate for the Union 
to act outside of the international frameworks provided by the International 
Tropical Timber Agreement, the GATT, or CITES. Accoring to the 
Commission, “Import restrictions unilaterally applied by the Community 
might...benefit other consuming countries without doing much to save tropical 
forests from destruction” (Demeret 1993:334-5). But EU’s foreign trade ministers 
have called for a system of timber identification aimed at protecting tropical 
forests from over-exploitation and destruction under the auspices of the 
International Timber Organisation. Their proposal was denounced by Malaysia 
who accused to EU of seeking to “bash” tropical timber exporting countries in 
order in order to protect its domestic forestry industry (Pleydell 1993).
Consistent with this policy, the EU strongly criticised a 1985 Indonesian 
ban on the export of unprocessed tropical timber from its rainforests. Disputing 
Indonesia's claim that the “ban [was] an integral part of a long-term programme 
for conservation and management of its forest resources,” the EU claimed that its 
real purpose was to protect Indonesia's wood processing industry, by requiring 
that the manufacture of ‘value added’ product such as furniture take place in 
Indonesia rather than in Europe or Japan (Hegenbart 1991:231). They argued that 
the export ban violated Article I of the GATT, which requires foreign and 
domestic firms to be treated equally.
Eco-Labelling
Eco-labelling has emerged as an increasingly important instrument of 




























































































consumers have indicated their interest in purchasing “green” products. A 1995 
survey reported that 82% of German consumers, 67% of Dutch consumers and 
50% of French and British consumers stated that they “incorporate[d] 
environmental concerns in their shopping behaviour” (Rosen and Sloane 
1995:76). According to another study, “67 percent of EU citizens had already 
purchased or were ready to buy ‘green’ products” (PRN 1996a: 1). Eco-labelling 
thus can offer European firms an important market incentive to improve their 
environmental practices. They can strengthen their environmental practices while 
maintaining their market shares.
The first and most successful national eco-labelling scheme, known as the 
“Blue Angel,” was initiated by Germany in 1977. Subsequently the Nordic 
Council established a “White Swan” programme and a number of other EU 
member states, including Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and Spain 
organised their own eco-labelling schemes (see Eiderstrom 1997). All are 
voluntary and are administered through non-state bodies.
The EU has become concerned about the proliferation of national eco­
labelling programmes because fifteen different national labels, each using 
distinctive criteria and designating different products, would confuse consumers. 
Furthermore, if national labelling bodies employed criteria that were more 
difficult for producers in other member states to meet, eco-labelling could 
undermine the single European market. In 1992, to address these problems, the 
EU authorised a voluntary “ecolabel” to be awarded to ecologically sensitive 
products that met objective environmental standards established at the EU level 
(Bristow 1994:50-55, Eiderstrom 1997).
This eco-label was not intended to replace national labels, but rather to 
supplement them, though the Commission assumed that many manufacturers 
would prefer the eco-label because it would be recognised throughout the Union. 
Manufacturers were first required to apply to a national body in either the 
member state where the product was manufactured or, in the case of mports, 
where it was first imported. If their product meets the criteria, an eco-label would 
be awarded which the manufacturer or distributor could then use throughout the 
Union. The Commission was instructed to apply a “cradle to grave” assessment, 
meaning that the ecological impact of each product would be evaluated 
throughout its production cycle-from the extraction of raw materials to its 
disposal after use.
The standards for awarding EU eco-labels are established jointly by the EU 
and the member states (NWF 1996:13-14). After the EU decides which specific 




























































































member state in order to conduct life-cycle assessment research. The “lead 
country” then develops product criteria based on this research. However these 
product criteria must then be approved by all member states in order to prevent 
any distortion of the single market. The member states are also responsible for 
processing applications for certification, awarding labels and monitoring label use 
within their borders.
However the establishment of “euro-labels” has proceeded slowly. By 
November 1994, standards had only been established for washing machines, 
dishwashers, kitchen rolls, toilet paper and soil improvers, while to date only a 
handful of products with European “eco-labels” are actually on sale in Europe 
(Harding 1995:10). Some national representatives have suggested reducing the 
number of ecolabelling criteria for each product group in order to expedite the 
approval process (EW 1996a: 11-12).
One of the difficulties the Union has faced stems from differences in 
priorities and practices among the fifteen member states. Packaging standards are 
a case in point.3 The EU's northern member states, namely Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden, argue that the extensive use of packaging produces 
large amounts of solid waste and wastes resources. Accordingly, they have 
insisted that the EU's “eco-daisy” label, which is meant to encourage the 
“environmentally-friendly” packaging of all products sold within the EU, be only 
granted to manufacturers who use both recycled and recyclable material in their 
packaging cartons or containers. However, the use of this criteria was strongly 
opposed by the Union's poorer, southern member states who contend that 
traditional packaging helps sell their products and is more cost-effective than 
recycling.
The EU's eco-labelling programme has also created tension between the 
Union and its trading partners (Jha and Zarrilli 1994:64-73). A number of the 
latter have expressed concern that both national and Union green labelling 
programmes might serve as trade barriers. For example, wood pulp and paper 
producers from the US, Canada, and Brazil claim that the EU's criteria for “green” 
kitchen rolls and toilet paper constitute non-tariff trade barriers as they place too 
much emphasis on the use of recycled materials and not enough on appropriate 
forest management. According to an official from the American Forest and Paper 
Association,
Just because a paper is recycled does not mean that it has less of an impact on the
environment. We have programmes on sustainable forestry that we feel are just




























































































as safe for the environment...We feel that the Commission's criteria is in fact 
designed to subsidise the recycling industry in Europe (BNA 1996a:935).
If a WTO complaint is filed by one of the EU's trading patterns, it may well 
revolve around the Union's paper standards (BNA 1996a).
An article in Newsweek in the spring of 1996 entitled, “Seeing Red Over 
Green,” highlighted the growing fears of much of the American business 
community over the EU's eco-labelling programme. It noted:
Paper recycling might make sense in Holland, but requiring paper made in 
Canada's sparsely settled west to use recycled pulp may consume more resources 
than it saves. Or take the EU's eco-label for T shirts. U.S. makers claim the rules 
permit more pollution from plants that dump wastewater into the sewer than do 
those that treat it on site, as most U.S. textile plants do (Levinson 1996:55).
The EU's eco-labelling criteria have come under especially strong criticism from 
a number of third world countries, who fear that the labels would be employed as 
a form of “green protectionism”. For example, Brazil's wood producers have 
criticised the EU's unwillingness to consider paper produced from damaged wood 
or sawdust as having been made from “renewable resources.” ABECEL, the 
association of Brazilian wood exporters, has urged the EU to revise its criteria for 
paper products in order to achieve a better balance between the promotion of 
recycling and sustainable forest management. ABECEL informed the EU that 
“establishing recycling as the overwhelming dominant criteria for judging the 
eco-label, to the exclusion of other principles is more likely to damage the cause 
of environmental protection than to help it” (Banki 1995:7). Likewise, third world 
producers have criticised the EU's efforts to establish a life-cycle standard for 
textiles that includes restrictions on the use of pesticides in cotton production. 
They claim this production standard will be used to protect European firms from 
the phasing out of the Multi-Fiber Agreement which has limited third world 
textile exports to Europe.
From the perspective of European producers, it makes sense to use the eco­
label to reward European firms who have been required to devote considerable 
resources to address European environmental problems, such as acid rain. By this 
logic, to label an imported product “green” if it were produced in ways that 
resulted in substantial emissions of sulphur - even if acid rain was not a problem 
in the exporting country - would unfairly place European producers at a 
competitive disadvantage. Not surprisingly, this logic has been sharply criticised 
by many of the EU's trading partners, who argue that they should not be required 




























































































have emerged over the application of EU production standards to paper and 
leather products produced outside the EU.
The trade implications of the EU's eco-labelling plans have come before 
the WTO. In response to widespread criticism of the GATT's decision in the 
tuna/dolphin case, in 1991 the GATT agreed to reconvene its Working Group on 
Environmental Measures and International Trade. This group was reconstituted as 
the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) following the establishment of 
the World Trade Organisation in 1995. Among the most important issues facing 
the Committee has been the WTO consistency of eco-labelling standards. 
Specifically, the CTE has attempted to reconcile the growth of eco-labels with the 
newly strengthened Standards Code that commits all WTO signatories to insure 
that “technical regulations and standards, particularly with respect to the 
packaging...and labelling of goods...create no unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade” (Banki 1995:15). Among the issues recently discussed by the 
WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment are mutual recognition, 
certification criteria, and transparency issues for eco-labelling.
There is considerable debate about whether the European eco-label falls 
within the scope of the Standards Code (Banki 1995). The European eco-label is 
clearly not a “technical regulation” because compliance is voluntary. However 
because the EU is a widely recognised organisation and governments play an 
important if informal role determining the criteria for awarding ecolabels, its label 
could constitute a “standard,” which would bring it within the Code's scope. This 
would mean that the EU would be required to make its labels non-discriminatory, 
transparent and based whenever possible on international standards. It would also 
be obligated to provide its trading partners with the opportunity to comment on 
the criteria used to award ecolabels.
The WTO wishes to encourage the use of eco-labels since they are clearly 
preferable to unilateral barriers to trade, such as the American tuna embargo. 
They also represent a promising new approach to environmental regulation, one 
which relies on market incentives rather than command and control. Significantly, 
in the tuna/dolphin case, the GATT dispute panel found the American “Dolphin- 
safe” labelling requirement to be GATT consistent, even though it was based on a 
process, rather than a product standard and sought to influence environmental 
conditions outside the legal jurisdiction of the United States. The panel reasoned 
that the American labelling standard was GATT consistent because it applied to 
all tuna fish caught in a given area and did not distinguish the products on the 
basis of national origin. Also, unlike the embargo, it did not prevent consumers 




























































































Still, the WTO, as well as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, fears that the growing use of eco-labels by developed countries 
may restrict trade. In particular, lifecycle based labelling programmes, which 
incorporate criteria relating to process and production methods, frequently appear 
to favour environmental conditions and preferences in the importing country. A 
central holding in the 1991 GATT dispute panel decision in the tuna/dolphin 
dispute between the United States and Mexico was that the GATT did not permit 
nations to restrict imports on the basis of how a product was produced or 
processed outside its own borders. From this perspective, the EU's use of life- 
cycle criteria for the awarding of eco-labels, represents a “slippery slope” which 
could lead to legitimating the use of process production measures (PPMs) as trade 
barriers.
For its part, the U.S. has claimed that the EU's eco-labelling programme 
“violates the law of international trade” and it has threatened to file a formal 
complaint with the WTO (Kirwin 1996:447). According to U.S. ambassador to 
the EU Stuart Eizenstat, the American concern was “not with eco-labels per se. 
Our problem is that the process is not sufficiently transparent and does not allow 
for the participation of non-EU industries” (Kirwin 1996). He added that he was 
also concerned about the problem of discrimination: “We want to be able to show 
that if we have equivalent environmentally benign production processes, they 
should be given an eco-label. Just because a U.S. process is different does not 
mean that it is environmentally unsound. Our hope is that this does not turn into a 
covert trade restriction by favouring EU processes" (Kirwin 1996). An American 
trade association official has stated that “this is a very important issue not only for 
the U.S. but for countries such as Canada and Brazil” (BNA 1996b:884). An 
American trade lawyer has characterised both the EU's packaging and labelling 
standards as an “area of enormous potential conflict,” adding that “as we move 
toward international standardisation of labelling, Europe is going to be setting the 
agenda” (BNA 1995). Nonetheless, the United States has yet to take any formal 
action under the WTO, largely because the European labelling programmes have 
yet to adversely affect the sales of any American product in Europe.
On February 28, 1996, the EU Commission issued a statement encouraging 
the CTE to “work on a WTO regime that ensures full transparency and non­
discrimination in voluntary eco-labelling schemes...” (PR 1996). The EU has 
specifically proposed that the Technical Agreement to Trade agreement be 
amended to permit the use of eco-labelling schemes based on a life-cycle 
approach, thus assuring the WTO consistency of its own scheme. This proposal 
has meet with opposition from many third world nations since it would legitimate 




























































































traded products. However, such an amendment would also subject eco-labelling 
to WTO discipline.
At the same time, a subcommittee of a working group of the International 
Organisation for Standards (ISO), a private standards setting body based on 
Geneva, has begun work on international standards for eco-labels. These would 
emphasise “credibility, consultation with stakeholders, transparency, accessibility 
and avoiding the creation of unnecessary obstacles to trade.”4 The working 
group's efforts are strongly supported by the United States and export-reliant 
developing countries who fear the use of eco-labels as trade barriers. However the 
development of an international consensus on an ISO Standard on Environmental 
Labels and Declaration (Draft Standard 14020) has proven difficult. In particular, 
a number of national delegations, including those from the UK, Germany and 
France, want the ISO's draft principles to serve as guidelines rather than 
standards, a position which the United States and Canada strongly oppose (EW 
1996b: 1-2).
There are, however, other ways of promoting international cooperation on 
eco-labelling. These include, for example, employing the principle of 
“equivalency” which would permit a product to qualify for an eco-label if it meets 
minimal or equivalent environmental standards, even if they were not identical to 
those of the country to which the product was exported. Another approach is 
“mutual recognition,” which would mean that the importing country's eco-label 
could be awarded to any products covered by the eco-label of the exporting 
country. All of these approaches remain at the discussion stage.5 The United 
Nations has begun work on devising a certification scheme which would reflect 
the environmental and economic priorities of both developed and developing 
countries (EW 1994).
Trade and Environment
In March 1996, the European Commission issued a report on trade and 
environment to the EU Council as part of its preparation for the first Ministerial 
meeting of the WTO in Singapore in December, 1996. It began by asserting that 
there was in principle no tension between a liberal trading system and
4 Statement of Belinda Collins, Director of the Office of Standards Services, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (FNS 1996).
5 Mutual recognition and equivalency approaches are also being considered in the context of 




























































































environment regulation: not only had a $250 billion market developed in green 
technology, but it estimated the EU's costs of compliance with strict 
environmental standards at only between 1 and 2% of overall production costs. In 
short, the EC claimed that strict regulatory standards were not a source of 
competitive disadvantage. However the EC cautioned that “friction can arise 
when domestic rules hamper or discriminate against imports....[or when] nations 
tackle transboundary problems by setting rules beyond their jurisdiction” (PRN 
1996b: 1). The former includes such measures as “life-cycle” eco-labelling and 
recycling requirements. The EC strongly endorsed the use “life-cycle” eco­
labelling requirements while at the same time emphasising the need for 
international rules to assure they are implemented in ways that are both 
transparent and non-discriminatory.
In the case of extra-jurisdictional environmental measures, the Commission 
urged the WTO to recognise the legitimacy of trade measures taken under 
multilateral environmental agreements and urged the EU to encourage 
environmental improvements in developing nations through market premiums 
and preferential access rather than eco-duties. Nonetheless, the EC did 
acknowledge that there might be “exceptional cases” that would justify trade 
restrictions taken outside a multilateral framework-for example if a state had 
“breached its obligation toward fundamental international environmental law and 
the health of the world ecosystem” (PRN 1996b:2).
The Commission's statement about the essential compatibility of free trade 
and environmental regulation clearly represented an effort to stake out the 
environmental “high ground.” Its efforts to make sure that WTO rules and 
procedures do not interfere with the strengthening of national, regional or global 
environmental standards, popularly referred to as “greening the GATT,” reflects 
the continuing strength of green parties and pressure groups in much of Europe as 
well as their substantial influence in the European Parliament. It also 
demonstrates the extent to which global environmental leadership has passed 
from the United States to the European Union.
While American environmental officials have been preoccupied in recent 
years with preventing the rolling back of existing environmental rules and 
regulations, EU environmental policy-making has been relatively innovative, 
developing initiatives such as eco-labelling and integrated pollution control. The 
EU has also taken the initiative in developing “greener” international standards, 
such as for eco-labelling and fur trapping.
The leadership role played by the Commission in Geneva contrasts with 




























































































Environment Committee has much more passive. One WTO official observed. 
“The U.S. is proposing nothing and systematically trashing everyone's else's 
proposals. It is a major obstacle to getting anything done” (Williams 1996:3). 
Ironically, while it was American pressure that led to the establishment of the 
trade and environment committee in the first place, the United States has yet to 
advance its own policy proposals on any of the critical issues on the committee's 
agenda. Caught between the Republican congressional victory in the 1994 mid­
term elections and the impending presidential election, and fearful of 
antagonising either environmentalists or industry, as of late 1996 the Clinton 
Administration had yet to propose any changes in WTO rules or dispute 
procedures that would strengthen the links between trade liberalisation and 
environmental improvement.
The Commission's statement also reflects two of the EU's most important 
priorities. Most importantly, it wants to make sure that its life-cycle eco-labelling 
programme is not challenged by the WTO. This programme is not only important 
to European environmentalists but also to European industry which is faced with 
the significant costs of complying with EU environmental directives. Eco­
labelling represents a strategy for enabling European consumers to share in these 
costs by promoting the “greener” products produced by European firms. It is a 
critical component of the EU's efforts to improve European environmental quality 
without unduly impairing the competitiveness of European industry.
Secondly, by supporting the establishment of new procedures for handling 
of disputes that might arise out of the trade provisions of multilateral 
environmental agreements, the EU accomplishes two objectives: it reinforces its 
long-standing opposition to American efforts to use trade restrictions to enforce 
extra-jurisdictional environmental regulations in the absence of international 
environmental agreements, and it protects European firms from imports from 
countries which have not complied with international environmental agreements 
to which the EU is a signatory. The latter issue is likely to become especially 
critical if and when an international agreement to curb carbon emissions is 
adopted.
The EU's efforts to reconcile the political demands from European 
environmentalists with the welfare of European firms is apparent in its position 
on each of the trade and environment conflicts in which it has been involved. The 
initial pressures for the EU's initiatives regarding imports of hardwoods from 
tropical forests, furs from animals caught using leg-hold traps and eco-labelling 
all came primarily from environmentalists. At the same time, it is noteworthy that 
none of these policies disadvantages European producers. On the contrary, all 




























































































Union's standards for paper products and its efforts to restrict the imports of 
hardwoods would benefit European wood processing firms and its forestry 
industry. Likewise, any restrictions imposed on fur imports would assist Europe's 
financially hard pressed fur industry. Most importantly, both European and 
national eco-labelling criteria, no matter how transparent or “non-discriminatory,” 
are far more likely to promote the sales of European products than of imported 
ones.
At first glance, it is difficult to find a logically consistent pattern in the 
EU's trade and environment policies. Thus the EU filed a formal complaint with 
the GATT against the American secondary embargo on tuna, arguing that nations 
should not use trade restrictions to influence the regulatory policies of their 
trading partners in the absence of an international environmental agreements. Yet 
at the same time, the EU has supported a ban on imports of fur from nations 
which permit the use of leghold traps which is vulnerable to the same objection. 
Likewise, many of the same criticisms the EU made of the American CAFE 
standard could also be made of the EU's eco-labelling programme, since both 
implicitly, though not explicitly, discriminate against imports. Clearly, what does 
explain these seemingly contradictory positions is that in each case the EU has 
favoured the interests of European firms.
Finally, as in the case of the EU's own environmental policies, important 
differences among the Union's member states have emerged. Concerns about 
animal protection are particularly strong in Great Britain and northern Europe, but 
are less widely shared in France and the EU's southern states. The Dutch and 
Austrians have been particularly strong advocates of trade restrictions to protect 
tropical forests, while the British and Irish remain relatively unenthusiastic about 
the Union's beef hormone ban (discussed in Vogel 1995). The American 
secondary tuna embargo directly affected only two member states, Spain and 
Italy, while the U.S. CAFE penalties only significantly affected German and 
British manufacturers. And in the case of eco-labelling, many of the EU's 
southern states have echoed the concerns of many of the Union's trading partners. 
Nonetheless, to date, the Union has spoken with one voice in international 
negotiations on each of these issues.
To date, the impact of the GATTAVTO on EU regulatory standards has 
been modest. No EU regulation has yet to be successfully challenged, though its 
leg-trap ban may be subject to dispute settlement proceedings in the future and its 
eco-labelling plan has certainly faced considerable scrutiny by its trading 
partners. In addition, the EU's efforts to restrict tropical hardwood imports and 
furs from animals caught with leg-traps have been constrained by fear of 




























































































EU environmental policy. In general, EU regulatory policies have yet not been 
significantly constrained by multilateral trade agreements. It is in part in order to 
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